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A Level Playing Field?  
Sports and Discrimination 
Lawrence M. Kahn
Cornell University
Economists and the public at large have become increasingly inter-
ested in the issue of discrimination in sports.  The public perceives that
to some degree the sports business is an oasis of equal economic
opportunity for minorities, who in this setting are judged and compen-
sated solely on the basis of their performance.  This impression is
underscored by the high level of minority representation in our major
team sports.  As of the mid 1990s, Major League Baseball (MBL) was
about 30 percent black, the National Football League (NFL) was 65
percent black, and black players made up 80 percent of the National
Basketball Association’s (NBA’s) ranks (Staudohar 1996).  Further,
some of the highest paid athletes are black: some multiyear NBA con-
tracts for black players top $100 million; in baseball, a majority of the
players who made at least $8 million in 1998 were black, despite the
30 percent black representation in the MLB; and in the NFL, while
most of the highest paid players in 1997 were quarterbacks (a dispro-
portionately white position, as I will discuss later), there were many
prominent, highly paid black players as well.
Despite this evidence of economic achievement, there is an omi-
nous undercurrent in the treatment of black professional athletes.  Until
the 1940s, of course, black players were excluded from professional
team sports.  And while African Americans are well-represented as
players in the 1990s, they are much less likely to be coaches, manag-
ers, or executives for sports teams.  Anecdotal accounts of team sports
identify many instances in which African-American players perceived
quotas against them, even in basketball, which as noted, is overwhelm-
ingly black (Bradley 1976; Halberstam 1981).  In 1987, a baseball
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team executive claimed that black athletes did not have the qualities
necessary to become managers or executives, and in 1988 a well-
known broadcaster was fired for making racist comments (Staudohar
1996).  Several players in the 1998 NBA lockout viewed the league’s
hostility as racially based (Samuels 1998).   And golf and tennis, after
years of being almost completely white sports at the professional level,
still have few black players on tour.  In many instances, tournaments in
these sports have been played at clubs that do not accept African Amer-
icans as members.
Public attention focuses on issues of race and sports in part
because of the celebrity of the players involved.  Moreover, the history
of racial integration in sports, beginning with the hiring of Jackie Rob-
inson by the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 and soon continuing in football
and basketball leagues has been an especially dramatic story.  The pro-
cess of racial integration in sports assumed national importance
because it took place against the background of African Americans’
struggle in the 1950s and 1960s for civil rights. 
In this talk, I survey evidence economists have gathered on the
extent of discrimination in sports.  As I will show, discrimination can
take on several forms, each of which has been the subject of economic
research.  Although the anecdotal evidence mentioned earlier is sug-
gestive of the mistreatment of black players, we need to know what the
anecdotes add up to.  Are they isolated incidents, or are they symptom-
atic of general patterns and trends in professional sports?  These ques-
tions can only be answered by studies that use statistical evidence.  In
this vein, I will talk about economic research on discrimination in
sports with respect to salaries, hiring, retention, positional segregation,
and customer prejudice.
ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ANALYZING DISCRIMINATION 
IN SPORTS
Before discussing evidence on discrimination in sports, it will be
useful to make clear what I mean by “discrimination” and what eco-
nomics has to say in general about the issue.   Beginning with the sem-
inal contribution of Gary Becker (1957), economists have usually
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defined labor market discrimination as the unequal treatment of
equally qualified workers. Becker (1957) identified three forms of dis-
crimination: employer, co-worker, and customer.  As we will see, each
of these forms has occurred in the sports business.  
In the Becker model under competition, assuming profit-maximi-
zation by at least one firm and constant returns to scale, we expect
entry and exit to eliminate employer and co-worker discrimination.
Discriminating employers will be driven out of business by the nondis-
criminator(s).  As analyzed in Chapter 4 of Becker (1957), if there is
co-worker discrimination, then in equilibrium we expect equally com-
petitive segregated firms with equal pay for equal work.  However, cus-
tomer discrimination is different in that an employer who pays more
money to workers whom customers prefer to deal with is likely to be
rewarded by the market relative to one who does not make such dis-
tinctions.  While workers not preferred by customers may be able to
find work in the noncustomer sector, in a general equilibrium context,
there is no guarantee that their incomes will not be hurt by the exist-
ence of customer discrimination (Kahn 1991a).  And if these nonpre-
ferred workers have a comparative advantage in the customer sector,
then they may still choose to stay there even if they face the effects of
customer discrimination. 
These features of the economics of customer discrimination sug-
gest that competitive forces are less likely by themselves to eliminate
this form of discrimination than discrimination based on employer or
co-worker prejudice.  The sports industry is perhaps the most promi-
nent example of a customer-based service sector.  Further, because
sports leagues are monopolies, they may not face the kind of free entry
that might serve to discipline discriminating employers.  Thus, we
expect that the economic forces tending to eliminate discrimination in
sports are perhaps weaker than in other industries.  
A common difficulty labor economists have faced in testing for the
existence of labor market discrimination is suggested by the definition
I just explained.  Namely, while it may be easy in many cases to tell
who is paid more money, discerning if there is unequal pay for equally
qualified workers can be a major problem.   This difficulty has affected
discrimination research on the labor force at large because databases
such as those from the census can only tell us how many years of
school a person completed, his/her age and marital status, and some-
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what crude measures of where he/she works.  For example, based on
the census, the “productivity” of a 25-year-old minor league hockey
player who played two years of college hockey is indistinguishable
from that of a 25-year-old NBA star such as Magic Johnson, who
turned pro after his sophomore year, and who in 1984 had already been
the NBA finals’ most valuable player (MVP) in 1980 and 1982.  Is any
pay gap between these two individuals evidence of unequal pay for
equal work?  In contrast to the census, in sports we have excellent con-
trols for productivity, as indicated, for example, in The Baseball Ency-
clopedia.   The sports industry provides us with an excellent
opportunity to study discrimination because data on player race, com-
pensation, and performance are so readily available. 
EVIDENCE ON DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS
In the early days of baseball integration, there was considerable evi-
dence to support Becker’s (1957) notions of employer, customer, and
co-worker discrimination.  First, employers discriminate if they treat
the output of, for example, black workers, as less valuable than the
identical output of white workers.  If all employers have the same tastes
for discrimination, then a common “discrimination coefficient” that
describes this discount in dollar terms for the pay of black workers will
result.  A nondiscriminating employer can earn more money than a dis-
criminator by hiring the most productive workers at the lowest cost pos-
sible, regardless of race, an opportunity that discriminators forgo.  This
prediction has been tested in the context of MLB’s integration.  Specif-
ically, some teams, particularly those in the National League in the late
1940s and 1950s, were more active in bringing black players onto their
rosters than were teams in the American League (Gwartney and
Haworth 1974; Hanssen 1998).  Teams that were more willing to use
black players had significantly more success on the playing field than
those that were not, an outcome predicted by Becker’s (1957) model.
Second, there was some evidence of co-worker prejudice in the
early days of baseball integration when the St. Louis Cardinals threat-
ened to strike rather than play against a black player, Jackie Robinson.1
Further, at least one Dodger player asked for a trade rather than play
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alongside Robinson, illustrating the tendency toward segregation, as
predicted by Becker (1957).   Third, there were many instances of cus-
tomer prejudice, including death threats against Robinson in his early
years with the Dodgers.
The labor market manifestation of these forms of discrimination
can include salary discrimination (unequal pay for equal work), hiring
discrimination, retention discrimination, and positional segregation.  A
considerable volume of research has attempted to determine the extent
of these outcomes.2  Salary discrimination is probably the most studied
issue, with a research design that can be described by the following
equation:
Eq. 1 ln S = B'Z + aWHITE + u,
where for individual players in a given sport, S is compensation, B is a
vector of regression coefficients, Z is a vector of performance indica-
tors, team characteristics, and market characteristics, WHITE is a
dummy variable equaling 1 for white players, and u is an error term.
This setup is similar to much work in labor economics that attempts to
assess the extent of discrimination by estimating a, the coefficient on
WHITE.3  What differs about sports is both the accuracy of the com-
pensation data (that may in many cases come directly from the relevant
players’ union, which keeps copies of the actual player contracts) and
the very detailed set of performance indicators available on athletes.  
A major difficulty in conducting labor market research on discrim-
ination using models like Eq. 1 is that WHITE may be correlated with
unmeasured productivity, controlling for the measured variables Z; if
so, then its estimated coefficient will be biased.  In sports, we have
much better controls than in labor market data in general.  For exam-
ple, a widely used data source such as the Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) allows one to control for years of schooling,
type of degree, length of labor market experience, firm seniority, union
coverage, and three-digit industry and occupation classification.  In
contrast, the Baseball Encyclopedia and other baseball data sources
allow one to control for batting average, stolen bases, home runs,
career length, team success, and a variety of other performance indica-
tors.  In addition, “occupation” in baseball is one’s position, a far more
detailed indicator than exists in the census classification, which is used
120 Kahn
by the PSID.  All players at the major or minor league level in all sports
would get the same three-digit occupation (“athletes”) and industry
(“entertainment and recreation services”) in the census classification.
Because of far better controls for individual performance, occupation,
and firm in sports, we presume that any correlation between WHITE
and u, given Z, is much less severe in sports than in more general labor
market data bases.
Analyses of equations like Eq. 1 have produced the most evidence
of salary discrimination in professional basketball.  In the mid 1980s,
controlling for various performance and market-related statistics, there
were statistically significant black salary shortfalls of 11–25 percent,
depending on sample and specification.4  The apparent discrimination
was especially noteworthy because, as Table 1 shows, for the 1985–
1986 season, black players on average earned $407,000, while whites
earned $397,000.  However, Table 1 also shows that black players out-
did whites in major performance categories such as playing time, scor-
ing, and rebounding.  In fact, using a regression like Eq. 1, which
controlled for performance and market-related variables, Kahn and
Sherer (1988) found the ceteris paribus WHITE effect to be 21–25 per-
cent, and this was highly statistically significant.  This combination of
results shows how important it can be to control for productivity, which
Table 1 Pay and Career Performance in the NBA
Year Black players White players
1985–1986









SOURCE: Kahn and Sherer (1988); Hamilton (1997).
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in this case was higher for black players, in assessing the extent of dis-
crimination.  While variables may have been omitted that could have
explained the ceteris paribus white salary advantage, reverse regres-
sion tests (which can under some restricted circumstances take account
of such problems [Goldberger 1984]), showed even larger apparent
discrimination coefficients (Kahn and Sherer 1988).   
By the mid 1990s, there was evidence of unexplained black salary
shortfalls only among the elite players in the NBA.  Table 1 shows that,
overall, blacks in 1994–1995 now outearned whites by about $240,000
and continued to outperform whites.  Hamilton (1997) found for the
1994–1995 season that, all else equal, there were no overall significant
racial salary differentials in the NBA.  The point estimate in an ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression like Eq. 1 was 0.010 for WHITE
with a standard error of 0.093.5  However, Table 2 shows that salary
differentials were not uniform across the distribution.  In particular,
black players outearned whites through the 75th percentile, while
among players near the top (the 90th percentile), whites were paid a
slight $16,000 more than blacks.  White stars did better relative to
black stars than whites did among the journeymen.  To examine the
question of unequal pay for equal performance across the distribution
of playing talent, Hamilton (1997) used quantile regressions like the
following:
Eq. 2 (Y90|Z) = B90'Z + a90 × WHITE,
where Y90|Z is the 90th percentile of conditional distribution of log sal-
aries given Z and B90 and a90 are quantile regression coefficients.  In
Table 2 Black and White NBA Salaries by Distribution Percentile, 
1994–1995 ($)








particular, a90 tells us the WHITE log salary advantage for players at
the 90th percentile of the conditional distribution of log salary.   
Regressions such as Eq. 2 can be run for any distribution quantile,
and the associated WHITE coefficients provide estimates of the unex-
plained salary premia for white players across the distribution.  When
Hamilton (1997) estimated models like Eq. 2, he found no significant
racial salary differentials at the 10th, 25th, and 50th percentiles but
positive and significant WHITE pay effects (at the 5.6 percent and 12
percent levels in two-tailed tests) at the 75th and 90th percentiles
amounting to 0.18 to 0.19 log points.6  These results suggest that while
there was no significant unexplained black salary shortfall on average
in the NBA in the 1994–1995 season, for star or near-star players (i.e.,
those at the 75th percentile and above in the conditional wage distribu-
tion), there may have been substantial discrimination in favor of
whites.  Again, the importance of controlling for performance is under-
scored because these white salary advantages are not apparent in Table
2, which, of course, does not control for performance.
In contrast to these findings of white pay advantage, ceteris pari-
bus, in the NBA, similar OLS analyses of salaries in baseball and foot-
ball have not found much evidence of racial salary discrimination
against minorities.  For example, in baseball, these analyses never find
that being white has a positive effect.  Among nonpitchers, in fact, sig-
nificantly negative effects of being white were found in 1977 and 1987
(Christiano 1986 and 1988) and during the 1985–1991 period (Irani
1996).  On the other hand, Kahn’s (1993) analysis of 1987 data, using
the same wage sample as Christiano (1988), found that these negative
effects of being white disappeared when a longer list of productivity
variables was added.  In football in 1989, Kahn (1992) found ceteris
paribus salary premia discrimination coefficients in favor of whites of
only 1–4 percent, and these were usually not statistically significant.
Kahn (1992) did find, however, that in the NFL, nonwhite players did
better in areas with a larger relative nonwhite population than with a
small relative nonwhite population; and whites did better in more white
metropolitan areas.  These findings suggest the influence of customers,
but they did not add up to large overall racial salary differences in the
NFL.
It is perhaps noteworthy that the one sport with the most evidence
of racial salary discrimination, basketball, was the sport with the larg-
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est black representation as of the mid 1990s at 80 percent, in contrast
to baseball’s 30 percent and football’s 65 percent.7   These differences
in racial representation suggest that customer preferences may have
something to do with the racial pay gap we observed in basketball.
And there is indeed evidence from the 1980s consistent with the exist-
ence of such preferences. For example, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found
that, all else equal, during the 1980–1986 period each white player
generated 5,700 to 13,000 additional fans per year.  The dollar value of
this extra attendance more than made up for the white salary premium.8
And other researchers found a close match between the racial makeup
of NBA teams in the 1980s and the areas where they were located,
again suggesting the importance of customer preferences (Brown,
Spiro, and Keenan 1991; Burdekin and Idson 1991; Hoang and
Rascher 1999).
However, by the 1990s, customer preferences for white players
were less evident.  Dey (1997), for example, found that, all else equal,
white players added a statistically insignificant and economically rela-
tively unimportant 60 fans apiece per season during the 1987–1993
period.  This evidence is consistent with the decline in the NBA’s over-
all, unexplained white salary premium from the 1980s to the 1990s,
although Hamilton’s (1997) finding for whites near the top of the dis-
tribution still suggests fan preferences for big name white players.  It is
possible that white stars add fans even if the average white player does
not.
Customer discrimination has also been found for baseball.  For
example, Hanssen (1998) found that white players added baseball fans,
all else equal, for the 1954–1972 period, and Irani (1996) obtained a
similar finding in baseball for 1972–1991.  Moreover, Nardinelli and
Simon (1990) found that, controlling for performance, in 1989, base-
ball cards for white players sold at a significantly higher price than
those of black players, providing further evidence of fan prejudice.
The lack of a white salary premium in baseball in the face of these cus-
tomer preferences remains a puzzle.  Perhaps the positional segrega-
tion and apparent retention discrimination in baseball (see the
following paragraphs) are the ways in which such preferences affect
the baseball labor market.
Other possible types of racial discrimination in sports involve hir-
ing, retention, and assignment discrimination.  These take the form of
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unequal probabilities of being drafted or retained, as well as positional
segregation.  First, regarding the draft, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found
that there were small, insignificant racial differences actually favoring
black players in draft order among NBA players on rosters in 1985,
conditional on college performance.  This suggested the absence of hir-
ing discrimination in the NBA, but we had no information on those not
drafted or not on rosters.  In the NFL, Conlin and Emerson (1998)
found indirect evidence that black players were drafted later than
whites of equal playing ability during the 1986–1991 period.  Again,
without information on those not drafted or not making the roster, we
have incomplete evidence on hiring discrimination.  But Conlin and
Emerson’s (1998) results suggest barriers to black players in the NFL.
Second, regarding retention, Jiobu (1988) found that from 1971 to
1985 in Major League Baseball, black players had a significantly
higher exit rate than whites, controlling for performance, position, and
age at entry.  Because baseball is likely to be virtually all major league
players’ best career opportunity, a reasonable interpretation of these
exit hazard differences is that they reflect team decisions not to offer
players a new contract.  And Hoang and Rascher (1999) found a simi-
lar result for the NBA: Other things equal, during the 1980–1991
period, white players had about two additional years of career length
(36 percent) than black players, again suggesting retention discrimina-
tion.  Whether this disparity will hold up in the 1990s or whether, like
the overall effects of race on attendance and NBA salaries, it will dwin-
dle, is an interesting question for future researchers.
Third, positional segregation by race has been noted in baseball
and football.  Christiano (1988), for example, found that black baseball
players in 1987 were overrepresented in the outfield and underrepre-
sented at infield and catcher.  Kahn (1992) found that in the NFL in
1989, nonwhite players were overrepresented at running back, wide
receiver, and defensive back and underrepresented at quarterback,
kicker, punter and offensive line (see Figure 1).  Whether this segrega-
tion represents current discrimination, past discrimination by high
school or college coaches, or self-selection is an open question, and
there is lively but inconclusive debate about these issues (Kahn 1991b).
Regardless of the cause of segregation, it appears to have some modest
consequences toward a slight salary gap favoring white football play-
ers.  Table 3 shows that the overall white salary advantage of 4 percent
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Figure 1 Percent Nonwhite by Position, NFL 1989
SOURCE: Data from Kahn (1992).
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is greater than it is for most of the NFL positions (the three positions
where whites outearn blacks account for only 33 percent of the league).
In fact, if nonwhites had the white representation at each position but
kept their own position-specific salary levels, then they would outearn
whites by an average of about $88,000.  With their actual positional
representation, nonwhites earned $13,000 less than whites.  In base-
ball, segregation has future consequences to the extent that managers
are drawn from the middle infield positions, which have been dispro-
portionately white (Scully 1989). 9
CONCLUSIONS
On the surface, it looks as though professional sports have come a
long way since the 1940s when black players were banned from partic-
ipating.  As of the 1990s, African Americans are much more than pro-
Table 3 White/Nonwhite Salary Ratio by Position, NFL 1989
Position






Offensive line 24.5 1.07
Defensive line 61.8 1.04
Tight end 47.3 0.99
Placekicker 14.3 0.96
Defensive back 91.6 0.94
Linebacker 64.0 0.91
Running back 91.0 0.69
Wide receiver 86.2 0.66
Quarterback 6.2 0.51
Total 60.1 1.04
SOURCE: Data from Kahn (1992).
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portionately represented at the major league level and earn on average
millions of dollars in baseball and basketball.  Further, pure salary dis-
crimination, which may have been extensive in the 1980s in the NBA,
appears to have declined by the 1990s and may currently be limited to
white stars; and there is no evidence of salary discrimination in base-
ball and little in football.  On the basis of these facts, one is tempted to
conclude that discrimination in sports is a nonproblem.
Yet there is evidence that fans have or have had racial preferences
in basketball, football, and baseball.  Do these preferences have any
consequences, as predicted by the economic theory of discrimination?
The answer is that while overt salary discrimination is not a major out-
come of these preferences (other than for the NBA in the 1980s or
white NBA stars in the 1990s), there is some evidence that reflects hir-
ing discrimination, positional segregation, and retention discrimina-
tion.   With customer preferences continuing in many instances for
white players and with evidence for these alternative forms of discrim-
ination, professional sports and society at large have some distance to
travel before they can say they have truly eliminated discrimination.  
Notes
1. This discussion of race and baseball is based on Okrent and Wulf (1989) and
Tygiel (1983).
2. For a survey of this evidence through the 1980s, see Kahn (1991b).
3. In some instances, researchers have used separate regressions for white and non-
white players, reflecting or testing the possibility that performance is rewarded
differently by race.
4. See for example, Kahn and Sherer (1988), Koch and Vander Hill (1988), Wallace
(1988), and Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991).
5. Other analyses of basketball salaries in the 1990s also failed to find ceteris pari-
bus racial salary differentials.  See Dey (1997) and Bodvarsson and Brastow
(1998).
6. The WHITE results for the lower percentiles were –0.184 (asymptotic standard
error 0.291) for the 10th percentile, –0.209 (0.183) for the 25th percentile, and
–0.005 (0.152) for the 50th percentile.
7. These figures were very similar in the 1980s as well.  See Staudohar (1996).
8. Hoang and Rascher (1999) also examined NBA attendance during the 1980–1991
period and found that, other things equal, larger values of (percent white on the
team/percent white in the city) were significantly positively associated with atten-
dance.  This finding is consistent with the idea of customer preferences for white
players.
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9. A lively literature has developed on the issue of discrimination against French
Canadians in the National Hockey League.  Some authors have found apparent
discrimination against this group in Canadian cities outside Quebec province, a
pattern consistent with the notion of customer discrimination (Jones and Walsh
1988; Longley 1995).  Yet others have disputed this interpretation and the findings
as well (Krashinsky and Krashinsky 1997).  There is also a debate over whether
French Canadians face entry barriers into the NHL, with some authors alleging
that French Canadians need to have a higher performance level to be drafted as
early as English Canadians (Walsh 1992; Lavoie, Grenier, and Coulombe 1992).
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